Victory or Repudiation? The Probability of the Southern Confederacy Winning the Civil War
Historians have long debated whether the Southern Confederacy had a realistic chance at winning the Civil War. Many scholars have spent years studying why the Union won the war and or/why the South lost the conflict (Beringer, 1991; Donald, 1961) . A large number of historians have suggested that the Confederacy had little chance of winning the Civil War given the Union's superior manpower and industrial base (Davis, 1996; Foote, 1990) . Foote, for example, argues that the North "fought that war with one hand behind its back" and could have easily deployed more men and resources to defeat the Confederacy (Ransom, 2005, p. 75) .
Another line of thought points to Confederate military defeats at Gettysburg or
Antietam when Britain was poised to recognize the South as key turning points of the war. Other scholars argue that the 1864 National Election was a key event when George
McClellan unsuccessfully ran for President of the United States on a peace party platform (McPherson, 1967; Brown and Burdekin, 2001; Ransom, 2005) .
1 Although there is a longstanding debate among academics, historians, and the popular press over the Southern Confederacy's chances of winning the Civil War, we are unaware of any study that has estimated the probability of a Confederate victory using contemporary financial market data.
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To provide some insight into this question, we introduce a new empirical methodology for estimating the probability of winning a civil war or revolution. The 1 Ransom (2005) has written a counterfactual history of the Southern Confederacy assuming that McClellan was elected President of the United States on a peace party platform. 2 Roll (1971) estimates the probability that the United States would return to the gold standard using Greenback and gold bonds. Other studies of Civil War financial markets have examined the effect of war and political news on exchange rates and bond prices to identify events seen as important to contemporaries of the Civil War (Willard et al, 1996: Brown and Burdekin, 2000; Davis and Pecquet, 1990; Weidenmier, 2002) .
methodology modifies a standard cash flow model used to price sovereign debt by imposing two identifying restrictions. First, we assume that the probability of debt reimbursement (for the Southern Confederacy) is equal to the probability of victory.
Second, we assume that bond market investors would receive nothing in the event of a (Confederate) defeat. The second assumption greatly simplifies the analysis and makes it possible to calculate victory probabilities within a fairly narrow range.
We apply this new methodology to estimate the probability of a Confederate victory during the American Civil War using a unique dataset of Southern gold bonds in
Amsterdam. The Confederacy issued a small number of gold bonds in 1863 that actively traded on the Dutch market until the end of the war. Unlike Southern investors who could only invest in government paper bonds, Dutch investors could buy rebel gold bonds that did not contain currency risk and/or invest their funds in "risk-free" British consols. 3 A third market perspective on Confederate victory prospects may also be the best way to determine whether the South had a fighting chance since many bondholders in the South may have purchased war bonds for patriotic reasons. As a result, financial data from Southern markets might bias empirical estimates of the probability of a Confederate victory.
Our empirical analysis suggests that the Amsterdam market gave the Confederacy about a 42 percent chance of victory before the battle of Gettsyburg/Vicksburg. News of the severity of the Confederate defeats led to a sell-off in rebel bonds and the probability 3 Burdekin and Weidenmier (2001) show that currency risk is not perfect correlated with war (default) risk during the Civil War using a natural experiment created by the implementation of the Confederate Currency Reform Act of 1864 that took effect at two different times in the Eastern and Western Confederacy. Bordo and Kydland (1995) argue that the gold standard was a contingent rule where countries would temporarily suspend specie convertibility to print money for war finance. Following the end of the war, a country would return to the gold standard. The assumption in our paper is that the Confederate government would honor its external debt in gold following the end of the war or at least until it was clear that defeat was inevitable (assuming the South successfully seceded from the United States We begin the analysis with a brief discussion of Confederate debt operations in Europe. This is followed by a discussion of the data and model used to estimate the probability of a Confederate victory. We then estimate the probability of a Confederate victory and employ a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the empirical results. We examine the effect of war news and political events on the probability of a Southern victory. The last section concludes with a discussion of the results as well as the application of the new methodology to other historical revolutions and civil wars.
II. Confederate Debt Operations in Europe
During the first two years of the war, the South believed that cotton was "King"
and that a self-imposed cotton embargo would draw England and France into the war.
They thought that European powers, especially England, were dependent on Confederate cotton to operate their textile mills. Although the Confederacy enjoyed considerable power in the world cotton market, many British textile mills were overstocked with Southern cotton early in the war because of a bumper crop in 1860 (Irwin, 2001 ). The failure of "King Cotton Diplomacy" also meant that the Confederate government lost an opportunity to purchase military supplies in Europe with cotton during the early stages of the war (Owsley, 1985; Ball, 1991 As shown by Burdekin and Brown (2000) and Weidenmier (2000) , the war bonds fluctuated in response to war and political news. Although the debt instrument actively traded on British financial markets, pricing the sovereign bond is complicated by an option clause that allowed investors to convert the security into cotton on demand within 60 days. Since an active market for cotton futures did not exist during the Civil War, and since one would need to estimate the probability of successfully running the blockade, the value of the option cannot easily be estimated using Black-Scholes. This means that it is very difficult to use the cotton bonds to estimate the probability of a rebel victory. to 20 years. Coupon payments were paid semi-annually on January 1st and July 1st (Davis and Pecquet, 1990; Todd, 1954; Dinger, 1868) . 5 Ball (1991) and Sexton (2006) estimate that the Southern Confederacy shipped more than 14 million gold dollars in domestic bonds to Europe during the war.
The Confederate government initially turned down offers to sell the war bonds at 60 percent of par value in December 1862 and mid-January 1863 to European investors.
The offer price was actually set by some British citizens who had privately purchased some Confederate bonds directly from the Southern government and were reselling the war debt on the secondary market (Fenner, 1969 (Fenner, 1969) . 6 The number of Confederate gold bonds sold in Europe is higher than 63,000 gold dollars given that the Southern government also privately sold a portion of the 1862 debt issue to British citizens (Fenner, 1969) . According to Venendael (1996, p.14) , (Veenendael, 1996) . Given the small number of convertible bonds sold in 1864, we focus the analysis on the larger and more liquid bond issue purchased by Dutch investors in the summer and fall of 1863.
newspaper from neighboring Belgium, also tracked movements in the war debt and reported price quotations of Confederate bonds in Amsterdam.
The large number of price quotes reported in the financial press suggests that the 
III. Empirical Analysis

A. Baseline Model
To estimate the probability of a Southern victory, we employ a standard discounted cash flow model to price Confederate bonds that traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Merrick (2001) shows that the value of a bond, V 0 , can written as:
where C t is the coupon payment on date t, N is the maturity date, F n is the principal repayment at maturity, R is the recovery value of the debt obligation in the case of default, P t is the adjusted probability of a timely payment of cash flows on date t, p t is the adjusted default probability between date t-1 and date t and f t is the risk-free present value factor. The model is estimated under the assumption of risk-neutrality given that an investor could easily hedge against a decline in Confederate bonds by buying long-term Union bonds that also traded on the Amsterdam market.
9
To estimate the probability of a Confederate victory, we make three assumptions in the baseline model. First, bondholders would receive nothing in the event of a Confederate defeat. The identifying restriction is motivated by three factors: (1) the Confederate government would cease to exist in the event of a defeat, (2) the war bonds traded for less than one gold dollar at the end of the war (May 1865), and (3) we were unable to find any reports in the Dutch financial press during the war indicating that investors believed that the United States government might honor the Southern bonds in the event of a Confederate defeat. 10 In addition, we make two other assumptions in the 9 Risk neutrality is a common assumption in finance that is often used to price options. Empirical studies that have dropped the risk-neutrality assumption have generally found that it has a limited impact on default probabilities (Hull, Predescu, and White, 2004) . 10 The behavior of Dutch bondholders after the war is quite different than the actions of investors in Confederate cotton bonds. After Lee surrendered to Union forces in mid-April 1865, cotton bondholders baseline model: (1) the Confederacy would faithfully repay and service their Dutch bonds in the event of a victory and (2) that European investors could not, ex ante, forecast the end of the Civil War. 11 Finally, we calculate the probability of a rebel victory assuming that the war bonds had a maturity length of 10-years given that the Amsterdamsch Effectenblad reported only one price for the different Confederate bond issues that traded on the Dutch market --the maturity varied from 10-20 years--. By using rebel bonds with the shortest maturity (10-year), we can estimate the (upper bound) probability of a rebel victory.
12
If we assume that bondholders received nothing in the event of a Confederate defeat, then the recovery value of the Confederate debt obligation can be set equal to zero in equation (1). The cash flow model can be rewritten as follows:
formed a committee to seek repayment of the defaulted rebel debt from the United States government. However, financial markets appear to have placed a very low probability on the possibility of a US government sponsored bailout given that the debt instrument traded for only five pounds sterling (five percent of par) at the end of the war. To quell expectations of an American bailout during the Civil War, the United States government issued several statements denouncing the idea that it would honor Confederate debts in the event of a rebel defeat (Economist, 1864 (Economist, , 1865 . Indeed, the United States passed the 14 th Amendment in 1866 that explicitly stated that the United States government would not honor rebel war debts. 11 Below, we discuss relaxing the baseline assumptions to check the robustness of the empirical results. 12 Assuming a 20-year maturity for the Confederate bonds does not qualitatively affect the empirical results.
If we use YTM BRI, the yield to maturity of the British consol, as a proxy for the rate of return of the risk-free asset and if one considers that for each date t, bondholders assign a constant probability of default in the future, then P n = P t and equation (2) 
where p confiv represents the probability of debt repayment and thus, by assumption, the probability of a Confederate victory.
The cash flow model is complicated by the fact that the Confederacy missed its first interest payment (and all others) on the debt obligation beginning in January 1864 13 .
The treatment of past unpaid coupons --which depended on negotiations between the Confederate government and its foreign bondholders after the war --could significantly alter the market's assessment of a Southern victory. To address this issue, we compute the probability of a Southern victory under three different post-war scenarios: (1) the Confederacy defaults on unpaid coupons, but faithfully repays future coupons and the principal of the debt obligation until maturity, (2) the Confederacy resumes honoring its debt, never defaults until maturity, and also honors past unpaid coupons and (3) the Confederacy resumes honoring its debt, never defaults until maturity, honors past unpaid coupons, and pays interest on the unpaid coupons. Although Scenario 3 was probably unlikely, it provides a lower bound estimate on the probability of a Confederate victory. 13 It is unclear whether the Confederacy actually defaulted on its first coupon payment in January 1864. The 1865 coupons were never repaid (see Dinger 1868, p. 375).
B. Probability of a Confederate Victory
The probability of a rebel victory before the battle of Gettysburg/Vicksburg is calculated using a price of 60 gold dollars, the price offered by European investors to buy rebel bonds in December 1862 and mid-January 1863. European investors gave Johnny
Reb approximately a 42 percent chance of victory. The probability of a Confederate victory would have been even higher if the bonds did not actively trade at this point of the war and there was a liquidity premium built in the price of the debt security. (2) Another possibility is that the Confederate government could have partially defaulted on its bonds or placed a moratorium on interest payments in the post-war period (assuming a military victory). Indeed, several Southern states, including Mississippi and Louisiana defaulted on their sovereign debts during the 1840s. European investors held a significant portion of these debt obligations (English, 1996) . Most Southern states ) R 15 Indeed, as stated by equation (1)
bondholders assign a constant probability of default in the future, then P n = P t and equation (1) show that if R > 0, then the probability of a confederate victory is lower than if we assume a complete default in which R=0. basis points lower than the yields offered on many of the highest quality railroad bonds (Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 1856-1859) . Nevertheless, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, incorporating a 10 or 20 percent hair cut in the baseline model or allowing for a five-year moratorium on interest payments has little effect on the probability of a Confederate victory. The long dated nature of the Confederate war bonds means that the debt security derived most of its value from the post-war period and is generally not very sensitive to changes in the contract terms of the debt obligation.
Investors may have also believed that the Civil War would end in one-, two-, or three years from the time that they purchased Confederate bonds. Under this assumption, the probability of a Confederate victory significantly increases only if the war lasts for a period of time that exceeds the maturity length of the bonds. This is unlikely and most contemporaries of the Civil War clearly did not believe that the Southern Confederacy could fight a long and protracted war given the Union's superior manpower and industrial military complex. Indeed, the Confederate government seems to have understood that they could not win a long conflict as shown by General Lee's attempt to win a decisive victory by charging entrenched Union positions at the battle of Gettysburg (Catton, 1989; Churchill, 1972 Although this study has focused on the American Civil War, the methodology employed in this paper could easily be applied to several other historical or modern day episodes to provide some insight into the evolution of victory probabilities during a period of civil war/revolution. The methodology might be particularly interesting to apply to a communist revolution given that Marxist regimes generally repudiate a country's debt obligations and do not recognize international capital markets. For example, it might be interesting to know the evolution of victory (defeat) probabilities during the Spanish Civil War, the Cuban Revolution of the 1960s, or the Chinese Civil War during the 1930s and 1940s. 16 Another possibility is to use the technique to estimate the probability that the thirteen colonies would win the American Revolution. The methodology could also be extended to estimate the probability of a victory by Germany during World War I or the Nazis during World War II. Applying the methodology to the world wars would be more complicated given that it is not clear whether the recovery value of the war bonds would be zero in the event of a defeat. We leave these items for future research. 16 Another possibility would be to apply the methodology to the Russian Revolution. However, Oosterlinck and Ureche-Rangau (2005) and Landon-Lane and Oosterlinck (2006) show that there was a peso problem with Russian after the Bolsheviks had ceased control of the country and repudiated the czar's external debt obligations. Many foreign investors wrongly believed that France or another foreign power might "bailout" bond market investors. 
